[CivilSoc] Russian-American Denuclearization Efforts

[Center for Civil Society International]

Following is an interesting and important story by a Washington Post
writer about the programs that have absorbed by far the largest
amount of U.S. government funds in Russia: those aimed at reducing
the size of the Russian nuclear weapons complex and reducing the risk
of proliferation.  It seems that results have been mixed, at best,
and current trends are not very favorable.
Holt Ruffin
CivilSoc moderator
__________________________
from Johnson's Russia List
#5437
11 September 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com
#2
Washington Post
September 11, 2001
U.S.-Russia Nuclear Programs Questioned
By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Nearly three dozen U.S.-Russian programs designed to prevent the
spread of Russian nuclear weapons and materials have foundered
because of disorganization and a loss of trust between the two
countries, according to an official who was instrumental in creating
them.
The programs, which have cost the United States more than $5 billion
to date, have "often lacked coordination not only with Russia but
also within" the U.S. government, said Siegfried S. Hecker, former
director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. "Nothing really
terrible has happened,"  Hecker said, but a decade after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, Russia's nuclear complex "is largely intact,
vastly oversized and overstaffed."
With the election last year of President Vladimir Putin, a former KGB
official, and the resurgence of Moscow's security services, access to
once-secret nuclear facilities has tightened, according to Hecker.
"Today, the window of opportunity appears to be closing, both because
Russia does not need our money as desperately and because the
security services have begun to close up the complex," he said in a
lengthy article published recently in The Nonproliferation Review, a
journal of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
Hecker, currently a consultant at Los Alamos, established early
contact with Russian nuclear scientists after the collapse of the
Soviet Union and was among the architects of the U.S. effort to avert
the spread of Russian nuclear weapons. His comments come as the
National Security Council is nearing completion of a review of the
U.S.-Russian nonproliferation programs ordered by President Bush in
March.
The administration already has signaled doubts about the
effectiveness of the effort by cutting the budget proposed by the
Clinton administration by $100 million. The programs, which will cost
$872 million this year, have also been criticized by some lawmakers
on Capitol Hill and by the General Accounting Office, the
investigative arm of Congress.
The nonproliferation effort began in the early 1990s to keep Russian
nuclear materials from spreading, and to stop nuclear scientists from
selling their knowledge to other countries. That was quickly
complemented by the Nunn-Lugar program, which partially funded the
destruction of Russian nuclear bombers, intercontinental ballistic
missiles and nuclear submarines, as required by arms control
treaties.
Overall, the effort gave rise to about 30 U.S.-Russian programs,
managed by the Defense, Energy and State departments, aimed at
tightening security at Russian nuclear facilities and providing money
as an incentive to keep Russia's weapons scientists and engineers
from moving abroad.
Speaking Friday at a meeting sponsored by the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Hecker said that although he remains a supporter of the
programs' nonproliferation goals, a major overhaul is warranted.
"What is needed is a coherent, comprehensive, integrated strategy,"
he said.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union built nearly 20,000 nuclear
warheads. Today, although the Russian strategic force is declining,
many thousands of warheads remain deployed at dozens of locations and
more than 60 storage sites. In addition, 1,000 metric tons of
weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and between 125 and 200 metric
tons of plutonium are spread throughout the country at various
facilities. Russia maintains a large network of production facilities
for uranium enrichment and nuclear reactors that continues to produce
weapons-grade plutonium, as well as a network of three dozen nuclear
weapons labs and dozens of specialized defense institutes.
Hecker warned that the primary joint program for protection, control
and accounting for nuclear materials and warheads at many of these
facilities "has all but come to a standstill." He blamed not only
increased Russian security, but also U.S. bureaucratic demands that
have "lost sight that these are Russian nuclear materials in the
Russian nuclear complex."
He said a multinational effort to provide Russian scientists and
engineers with civilian job opportunities has been a success, but an
Energy Department initiative that teamed Russian institutes with
Western businesses has floundered, in part because of Russian
security concerns.
The Energy Department's nuclear cities program, aimed at helping
Russian scientists in regions once closed to the West, has also run
into trouble. Newly aggressive Russian guards have made it difficult
for American businessmen to gain access to scientists with whom they
are attempting to arrange deals. In addition, funding limitations on
the U.S. side -- including a sharp cut by the Bush administration in
the Clinton-proposed $30 million budget for next year -- have made it
less attractive to the Russian government.
Two programs to reduce nuclear materials have had mixed success. One
to turn highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium into fuel has been
successful, and there is competition within the U.S. to get it
expanded. The other, to burn plutonium or immobilize it so it cannot
be used for weapons, has never gotten started, in part because the
Russian plan for burning would cost $2 billion or more. In addition,
the Russians continue to produce plutonium from reactors they use for
energy generation and see plutonium as part of their broader plan to
encourage nuclear power.